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ABSTRACT This paper presents a thorough experimental study on key generation principles, i.e., temporal
variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation, through a testbed constructed by using wireless
open-access research platform. It is the first comprehensive study through: 1) carrying out a number of
experiments in different multipath environments, including an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber,
and an indoor office environment, which represents little, rich, and moderate multipath, respectively;
2) considering static, object moving, and mobile scenarios in these environments, which represents different
levels of channel dynamicity; and 3) studying two most popular channel parameters, i.e., channel state
information and received signal strength. Through results collected from over a hundred tests, this paper
offers insights to the design of a secure and efficient key generation system. We show that multipath
is essential and beneficial to key generation as it increases the channel randomness. We also find that
the movement of users/objects can help introduce temporal variation/randomness and help users reach an
agreement on the keys. This paper complements existing research by experiments constructed by a new
hardware platform.
INDEX TERMS Physical layer security, key generation, wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key generation exploiting unpredictable characteristics of
wireless channels is information-theoretically secure [1], [2]
and has been an active research direction in physical layer
security (PLS) [3], [4]. In this technique, two legitimate users,
Alice and Bob, measure their common but noisy channel in an
alternate manner, through which they can get correlated but
not identical observations. Then they will quantize their cor-
related analog measurements into binary values separately,
and their keys are usually not the same. Alice and Bob later
reach an agreement on the same key through information
reconciliation [5]. Finally, they employ privacy amplification
to remove the information revealed during the information
reconciliation [6]. Therefore, key generation is able to estab-
lish a cryptographic key securely from the noisy observations.
As one of the few implementable PLS techniques, key gen-
eration can be constructed in current wireless devices. Many
prototypes have been reported involving key extraction from
channel state information (CSI) in IEEE 802.11n systems
[7], [8], ultra wideband (UWB) systems [9]–[12], and
FM/TV systems [13], or from received signal strength (RSS)
in IEEE 802.11 systems [14]–[17], IEEE 802.15.4 sys-
tems [18]–[23], and Bluetooth systems [24]. The testbeds
consist of laptops, smartphones, customized platforms such
as universal software radio peripheral (USRP) [25], or any
other wireless platform that can provide sufficient channel
information.
Key generation requires the channel to satisfy certain
conditions with respect to temporal variation, channel reci-
procity, and spatial decorrelation. Temporal variation is the
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main random source for key generation, which can be
introduced by the movement of any users and/or objects in
the wireless environment. It is feasible to exploit channel
randomness in the frequency domain [7], [8], [18], [22], [26]
and spatial domain [27], [28], but the randomness is limited
and cannot be updated in a static environment. Experiments
have been carried out in the indoor and outdoor environments
and have shown that the mobility of users and/or objects is
sufficient to introduce randomness [15], [20], [21].
Channel reciprocity indicates that the signals at each end of
the same link have identical statistical features, such as chan-
nel gains, phase shift, time delay, etc, which is the basis of key
generation systems. Although there is ongoing research effort
adopting full-duplex hardware [29]–[31], most of the current
commercial wireless devices work in half-duplex mode. Key
generation usually works in time-division duplexing (TDD)
systems and slow fading channels. Therefore, the received
signals are generally asymmetric due to the non-simultaneous
measurements and independent noise in different hardware
devices, whose effects have been studied theoretically in [26]
and experimentally in [32]. Non-simultaneous measurements
can be compensated by interpolation to emulate the channel
being measured at the same time [19], [21] while noise effect
can be suppressed by low pass filtering [26], [33].
The conclusion from applying spatial decorrelation means
that any eavesdropper located more than half-wavelength
away from legitimate users experiences uncorrelated fad-
ing. This property is highly influenced by the channel con-
dition [34]. In a rich multipath environment with uniform
scattering, according to the Jakes model, when the num-
ber of scatters grows to infinity, the correlation function is
the Bessel function of zeroth order and the signal decorre-
lates when d = 0.4λ (approximately half-wavelength) [35],
which is the theoretic basis of spatial decorrelation. Some
experiments have been carried out to verify this property in
UWB systems [10]–[12] and IEEE 802.11g systems [36].
In contrast, spatial decorrelation has also been found to not
hold in some channel conditions by simulation [37], [38] and
experiments [38]–[40]. In this case, key generation cannot be
deemed secure and requires special design consideration to
combat eavesdropping when eavesdroppers are close to the
legitimate users.
In order to design an effective, workable, and secure key
generation system, the above three principles, i.e., tempo-
ral variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation,
should be always satisfied. Although there have been a num-
ber of theoretical and experimental studies on these prin-
ciples, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there is no
thorough study examining the effects of environment con-
ditions and channel parameters on the key generation. For
example, [10], [11], and [36] studied channel reciprocity and
spatial decorrelation in indoor environment by keys generated
from channel impulse response (CIR) in a UWB system and
from RSS in an IEEE 802.11g system, respectively. However,
key generation performance greatly depends on the chan-
nel conditions, such as the multipath level and dynamicity,
which has not been studied comprehensively yet. In addition,
the channel parameter used for key generation also has an
impact. For example, it has been reported that RSS-based
key generation systems are subject to predictable channel
attacks [13], [15] while CSI-based systems are robust to such
attacks [7], [13].
In this paper, we study key generation principles com-
prehensively through experiments with different channel
conditions. We implement a testbed using a customized
FPGA-based wireless platform known as wireless open-
access research platform (WARP) [41], which supports
IEEE 802.11 orthogonal frequency-division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) physical (PHY) layer and distributed coordi-
nation function (DCF) MAC layer protocols. This platform
allows us to have full access to the transmission parameters,
which are not available in the commercial network interface
cards (NICs). A key objective here is to make minimal
or even no change to the off-the-shelf wireless protocol,
which requires cross-layer design and presents new research
challenges. Our contributions are as follows.
• We carry out much more comprehensive experiments
than previous research in environments with various
multipath and dynamic levels. In particular, we conduct
over a hundred tests in an anechoic chamber, a rever-
beration chamber, and an indoor office environment,
which represents little, rich, and moderate multipath,
respectively. We consider different dynamic channels,
i.e., static, object moving, and mobile scenarios, in these
environments. Both CSI and RSS are collected from the
testbed and studied with the aim of assessing suitability
for key generation when a certain channel conditions
satisfy.
• Through the comprehensive experimental results, we are
able to offer insights and advices for the design of suit-
able key generation schemes in different environments
and scenarios. We found that in a dynamic environment,
(i) the randomness introduced by temporal variation is
sufficient for key generation; and (ii) cross-correlation of
the channel measurements is high enough to make Alice
and Bob reach an agreement, while in a static scenario
these properties do not hold and key generation fails. We
also conclude that multipath can improve the security
performance of key generation. In a multipath environ-
ment, spatial decorrelation property holds and eaves-
droppers can only get very limited information, while in
an environment with little multipath such as an anechoic
chamber, eavesdroppers can obtain a highly correlated
channel and key generation cannot be deemed secure.
• We complement existing theoretical analysis and prac-
tical research by providing results on a new testbed
constructed by WARP and much more experiments in
different environments.
We have studied temporal variation and channel reciprocity
in CSI-based systems through experiments in an indoor
office environment [42]. This paper considerably extends and
complements our previous work by providing a much more
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thorough study through undertaking more detailed exper-
imental work in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation
chamber, and an indoor office environment, and performing
analysis for both CSI and RSS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces CSI, RSS, and related IEEE 802.11 PHY and
MAC layer protocols. Section III designs the testbed and
presents the test environments and scenarios. Section IV
studies the key generation principles. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we introduce signal models of CSI and RSS,
and the related IEEE 802.11 PHY and MAC layer protocols,
which are important background for the entire paper.
A. SIGNAL MODEL
The received signal in time domain can be given as
y(t) = h(τ, t) ∗ x(t − )+ n(t), (1)
where x(t) and y(t) are data input and output, respectively,
h(τ, t) is the CIR, ∗ denotes convolution,  is the time offset
in the receiver due to imperfect time synchronization, and
n(t) is the hardware noise.
RSS is currently the most popular parameter for key gen-
eration as it is available in various wireless standards. RSS is
usually reported as the average received signal power, which
can be calculated by averaging the received power over a
certain samples and written as
P(t) = 1
1T
∫ t+1T
t
|y(t ′)|2dt ′, (2)
where 1T is the time duration of the samples. For example,
one possible method to calculate RSS specified in the
Section 8.3.9.2 of the IEEE 802.16 standard [43] is
RSS = 10−
Grf
10
1.2567×104V 2c
(22B)R
(
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|yI or Q[n]|)2, (3)
where B, R and Vc are the ADC precision, input resistance
and input clip level, respectively, Grf is the analog gain from
antenna connector to ADC input, yI or Q[n] is the nth sample
of the I or Q branch of the signal, andN is the number of sam-
ples. The chip CC2520 [44], a popular transceiver for wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), calculates RSS by averaging the
received power over 8 symbol periods (128 µs), whereas
the chip MAX2829 [45], an IEEE 802.11a/b/g transceiver,
reports RSS in voltage, although it is mapped from the power.
Different interpretations inhibit the theoretical modelling of
RSS and present challenges when heterogeneous devices are
used [15], [17], [46].
The received signal in frequency domain can be obtained
by applying inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to the time
domain signal. This is given as
Y (f , t) = H (f , t)X (f , t)e−j2pi f  +W (f , t)
= H˜ (f , t)X (f , t)+W (f , t), (4)
where
H (f , t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)e−j2pi f τdτ, (5)
H˜ (f , t) = H (f , t)e−j2pi f  . (6)
Here τmax is the maximum delay of the CIR. The channel
frequency responses (CFRs) can be estimated by
Ĥ (f , t) = Y (f , t)
X (f , t)
= H˜ (f , t)+ ŵ(f , t). (7)
The CSI mainly includes CIR and CFR, which are related
to each other as shown in (5). CIR can be obtained in
UWB systems [9]–[12], and their testbeds are usually con-
structed by oscilloscope, waveform generator, etc. CFR can
be estimated in OFDM, which is a popular technique used in
IEEE802.11a/g/n. CFR is not publicly available in most of
the commercial NICs, but can be obtained in the Intel WiFi
Link 5300 NIC [47] or customized hardware platforms, such
as WARP or USRP.
A summary of RSS-based and CSI-based key generation
systems is given in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Summary of RSS-based and CSI-based key generation systems.
B. IEEE 802.11 PROTOCOL
1) OFDM PHY
The IEEE 802.11a/g/n standards [48] adopt OFDM for sig-
nal modulation. The physical layer packet of IEEE 802.11
OFDM consists of a preamble, a SIGNAL field, and a DATA
field, as shown in Fig. 1. The preamble is used for automatic
gain control (AGC), synchronization and channel estimation,
and is equivalent to 4 OFDM symbols in length. The SIGNAL
field carries the information of convolutional coding rate R
and the mapping scheme for the DATA field, forming a
FIGURE 1. Structure of IEEE 802.11 OFDM physical layer packet. Cyclic
prefix (CP) is not shown for simplicity. The length of the blocks in the
figure is not scaled.
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complete OFDM symbol. The number of OFDM symbols of
the entire physical layer packet can be calculated as
NOFDM = 4+ 1+ d8lMAC + 16+ 6NsubcNbpscR e, (8)
where
lMAC = 24+ 4+ lpayload (9)
is the number of bytes of the MAC packet, lpayload is the
number of bytes of the MAC payload, Nsubc is the number
of data subcarriers, 48 in IEEE 802.11 standard, and Nbpsc is
the number of bits per subcarrier which is determined by the
mapping scheme.
In IEEE 802.11 OFDM systems, least square channel esti-
mation is widely used to estimate the channel with the aid of
long training symbols (LTSs), which is composed ofM (=52)
subcarriers. The estimated channel response can be given as
Ĥuv(fm, t) = H˜uv(fm, t)+ ŵv(fm, t), (10)
where fm is the mth subcarrier’s carrier frequency, u denotes
the transmitter (Tx) and v denotes the receiver (Rx).
FIGURE 2. Timing between data packets received by the Rx and ACK
packets received by Tx. The packet length and time intervals are not
scaled.
2) DCF MAC
In IEEE 802.11, the DCF is used to coordinate access to
the wireless medium, which is the basis of the standard car-
rier sense multiple access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)
access mechanism. In order to ensure reliable reception of
the unicast frame, a positive acknowledgement (ACK) frame
is transmitted from Rx to Tx after waiting a short interframe
space (SIFS) when Rx successfully receives a data packet
from Tx, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The time difference between
the data packets and the corresponding ACK packets can be
calculated by
1tAB = tdata + tSIFS
= NOFDM × TOFDM + tSIFS
= (5+ d8lMAC + 16+ 6
N dsubcNbpscR
e)× 80
BW
+ tSIFS, (11)
where tSIFS is the time duration of the SIFS and equals to
16 µs in a 20 MHz channel spacing IEEE 802.11 OFDM
system, and TOFDM is the time duration for each OFDM
symbol which can be calculated as the time for each data
symbol ( 1BW ) multiplying total number of data symbols in one
OFDM symbol (80 including CP).
When an IEEE 802.11 network is configured as an infras-
tructure basic service set (BSS), the network is handled by
an access point (AP) that broadcasts Beacon frames to all
the users, i.e., mobile stations (STAs), in its communication
range, typically every 100 ms. The Beacon carries infor-
mation about the BSS parameters, e.g., timestamp, service
set identity (SSID), Beacon interval, etc. STAs can use this
information to identify the network and keep synchronized
with the AP.
III. TESTBED DESIGN AND TEST ENVIRONMENTS
A. TESTBED AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The testbed is constructed by using WARP hardware, which
is a scalable and extensible programmable wireless platform
and allows fast prototype of physical layer algorithms [41].
Due to the limited number of WARP boards, there were eight
users in each experiment, with one Alice, one Bob and six
eavesdroppers, but this still represents a viable experimental
setup. We used the channel measurements of Alice and Bob
from one experiment to study temporal variation and channel
reciprocity, as presented in Section IV-A and IV-C, respec-
tively. In order to study spatial decorrelation, two placement
configurations were used in order to test the effect of the
location of eavesdroppers, as shown in Fig. 3. Without loss
FIGURE 3. User placement. (a) Linear placement. (b) Circular placement.
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of generality, eavesdroppers were monitoring Bob. Several
experiments were carried out by changing eavesdroppers’
distances to Bob and all the results with different distance
configurations were put together, as shown in Section IV-D.
An IEEE 802.11 reference design has been developed for
WARP v3 hardware, which is a real-time FPGA implemen-
tation of the IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and DCF MAC.
A Python experiment framework has also been developed
to (i) control the behavior of the PHY and MAC without
interfering with the real-time operation of the wireless inter-
faces, and (ii) log the transmission parameters, such as times-
tamp t , received signal power Puv(t), and channel estimation
Ĥuv(f , t), etc. The WARP and PC are connected by a 1 Gbps
Ethernet switch so that the logged data can be transferred to
the PC for further processing. In this paper, the channel mea-
surements Xuv(t) consist of |Ĥuv(f , tu)| and Puv(tu). The time
offset, , adds rotation to the phase of Ĥ (f , t) but does not
affect the amplitude. Therefore, the amplitude of frequency
response, i.e., |Ĥ (f , t)|, is used.
All the users were runningWARP 802.11 reference design.
They operated at a carrier frequency of 2.412 GHz so the
wavelength is λ = 12.44 cm. Alice and Bob were the
legitimate users wishing to establish a secure key between
them. They were configured as AP and STA, respectively,
and formed an infrastructure BSS. Eavesdroppers were not
associated to Alice but could overhear and record all the
transmissions in the network. They also did not attempt to
initiate active attacks such as disrupting the transmissions by
jamming, i.e. only passive eavesdropping is considered.
The key advantage of the experimental setup was to make
no change to the off-the-shelf wireless standard, so the results
can be readily transferred to available commercial wireless
systems. Data and ACK packets were used for channel mea-
surement. As shown in Fig. 2, Alice sent data packets to
Bob every 0.96 ms,1 which allowed Bob to get a set of
channel measurements XAB(tA). Bob was associated to Alice,
so he transmitted ACK packets to Alice upon successful
reception of data packets. The ACK packet is also modulated
by OFDM so Alice can get a set of channel measurements
XBA(tB). Although eavesdroppers were not associated to the
AP, they were able to receive all the transmissions and record
XAEj (tA). Bob and eavesdroppers can regularly update their
timing through the timestamp received in the Beacon frames,
broadcast by Alice every 100 ms. As there is no sender
address in the ACK packets, they can only be distinguished
by their temporal location compared to the timestamp of the
corresponding data packets. Keeping users synchronized is
thus essential to pair their channel measurements.
In order to ensure a high cross-correlation between the
measurements of Alice and Bob,1tAB should be kept as small
as possible. The minimum length of MAC payload, lpayload,
required by the WARP 802.11 reference design is 20 bytes,
1The WARP 802.11 reference design requires a transmission resolution
of 0.064 ms and 0.96 = 0.064 × 15. As a sampling period of 0.96 ms was
deemed fast enough to track the signal variation in slow fading channels in
this paper, a multiple of 15 was deemed suitable.
therefore the length of the MAC packets, lMAC, calculated
by (9), was configured to be 48 bytes in order to keep the
duration of the packet as small as possible. In this paper
the WARP boards were running at a rate of 18 Mbps, i.e.,
R = 3/4 and Nbpsc = 2. In this case, according to (11),
1tAB = 0.06 ms. This time difference is small enough to
ensure the environments experienced by the data packets and
the corresponding ACK packets are almost the same. In a
slow fading environment, this only contributes a very small
displacement. For example, when Alice is moving at a speed
of 1 m/s, the distance she moves in this time interval is
only 0.006 cm.
B. TEST ENVIRONMENTS AND SCENARIOS
In this paper, we test the key generation performance in
different multipath environments. Over a hundred tests were
carried out in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber,
and an office environment with different scenarios. Anechoic
chamber and reverberation chamber represent two extreme
environments whose special properties can help provide a
better understanding of the key generation applications in
various channel conditions.
1) ANECHOIC CHAMBER
Measurements were conducted in an anechoic chamber
located in the ECIT research center, Queen’s Univer-
sity Belfast to study the key generation principles in a
free space environment where there is little multipath but
always with a strong and dominant line-of-sight (LoS) path.
A setup photo with eavesdroppers placed linearly is shown
in Fig. 4(a).
2) REVERBERATION CHAMBER
Experiments were done in a reverberation chamber located in
the University of Liverpool where a rich multipath environ-
ment was created. A setup photo with eavesdroppers placed
linearly is shown in Fig.4(b).
3) OFFICE ENVIRONMENT
The experiments were also carried out in an office environ-
ment in the ECIT research center, Queen’s University Belfast,
which is a typical indoor environment with cupboards, chairs,
desks, etc.
We considered different scenarios to study the key genera-
tion performance under various levels of channel dynamicity.
We tested three scenarios for the experiments in the anechoic
chamber and office environment.
• Static: All the users were stationary with no movement
in the room.
• Object Moving: All the users were stationary with an
object, a person, moving at the speed of about 1 m/s in
the room.
• Mobile: Bob and eavesdroppers were stationary while
Alice was put on a trolley and moved by a person at the
speed of about 1 m/s.
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FIGURE 4. Experiment setup. (a) Photograph of experiment setup in the anechoic chamber located in the ECIT research center, Queen’s University Belfast.
(b) Photograph of experiment setup in the reverberation chamber located in the University of Liverpool.
In the reverberation room, we rotated two stirrers continu-
ously at 5 degrees per second in order to create a dynamic
environment.
IV. STUDY OF KEY GENERATION PRINCIPLES
In these experiments, the key generation principles, i.e., tem-
poral variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation,
were studied. We also evaluated the randomness of the key
sequence quantized from the measurements. Unless other-
wise specified, measurements were taken for 60 s, which is
much larger than the coherence time of the channel (in the
order of 10 ms) and long enough to represent the channel
variation.
The channel measurements, i.e., CSI and RSS, were then
quantized into binary values using single-bit cumulative dis-
tribution function (CDF)-based quantizer [19], which is given
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 CDF-Based Quantization Algorithm
INPUT: Xuv(t) % Analog channel measurement
OUTPUT: KXuv % Quantized key bits
1: F(x) = Pr(Xuv(t) < x)
2: η0 = −∞
3: η1 = F−1(0.5)
4: η2 = ∞
5: for j← 1 to N do
6: if Xuv(tj) < η1 then
7: KXuv(j) = 0
8: else
9: KXuv(j) = 1
10: end if
11: end for
Temporal variation can be quantified by the temporal auto-
correlation function (ACF). In a wide sense stationary (WSS)
random process, the ACF is irrelevant of the observation
time t but only determined by the time difference 1t , which
is defined as
RXuv (1t) =
E{(Xuv(t)− µXuv )(Xuv(t +1t)− µXuv )}
E{|Xuv(t)− µXuv |2}
,
(12)
whereE{·} denotes the expectation calculation andµXuv is the
mean value of Xuv(t).
Signal similarity is quantified using the Pearson correlation
coefficient, expressed as
ρXuv,u′v′ =
E{XuvXu′v′} − E{Xuv}E{Xu′v′}
σXuvσXu′v′
, (13)
where σXuv is the standard deviation of Xuv(t). The correlation
coefficient is used in the analysis of channel reciprocity and
spatial decorrelation.
Since the channel measurements of users are not identical
due to non-simultaneous measurements and noise, there are
key mismatches between users after quantization. The key
disagreement rate (KDR) can be defined as
KDRXuv,u′v′ =
∑Nk
j=1 |KXuv(j)− KXu′v′ (j)|
Nk
, (14)
where KXuv and K
X
u′v′ are the keys quantized from
Xuv(t) and Xu′v′ (t), respectively, and Nk is the length of keys.
KDR is an essential parameter for key generation and deter-
mined by the cross-correlation and quantization scheme [36].
Therefore, KDR is also used to evaluate channel reciprocity
and spatial decorrelation.
A. TEMPORAL VARIATION
Temporal variation is commonly adopted as random sources
for key generation since it can be readily introduced by the
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movement of the users and/or objects in the wireless environ-
ments. A wireless channel can be modelled as a wide sense
stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS) random process
in a rich scattering multipath environment [49]. Under this
assumption, it has been analyzed through simulation in [26]
that OFDM subcarrier’s channel response Ĥuv(fm, t) is a
WSS random process.
In this section, temporal ACFs of CSI and RSS were cal-
culated from the experimental results in the anechoic cham-
ber, the reverberation chamber, and the office environment.
RĤuv (fm,1t) and RPuv (1t) were calculated using (12) by
substituting Xuv(t) with |Ĥuv(fm, t)| and Puv(t), respectively.
The experimental results in the anechoic chamber are plotted
in Fig. 5 for static, object moving, and mobile scenarios. For
CSI, onlyRĤBA (f1,1t) was selected as an example for brevity,
as other subcarriers’ ACFs were quite similar.
FIGURE 5. Normalized temporal ACF, RĤBA
(f1,1t) and RPBA (1t), in the
anechoic chamber. t2 = t1 + 10 s. (a) Static scenario. (b) Object moving
scenario. (c) Mobile scenario.
As there is no interference from other wireless networks
inside the anechoic chamber, the channel remains the same
in the static scenario. Therefore, the variation of the received
signal is only due to the hardware noise, which is temporally
uncorrelated, as shown in Fig. 5(a). This seems beneficial
for key generation as the samples are temporally indepen-
dent, however, it is challenging for the users to agree on
the same key as discussed in Section IV-C. In the object
moving and mobile scenarios, as shown in Fig. 5(b) and
Fig. 5(c), respectively, the samples are correlated in the time
domain and RĤBA (f1,1t) and RPBA (1t) only depends on 1t
but is irrelevant to the observation time t , indicating both
|ĤBA(f1, t)| and PBA(t) are WSS random processes.
The curves of RĤuv (fm,1t) and RPuv (1t) are quite similar,
although we did observe from experiments that |Ĥuv(fm, t)|
usually decorrelates a little faster thanPuv(t), with an example
shown in Fig. 6. In addition, RXuv (1t) in different scenarios
varied because it is affected by both the environment and
channel variation introduced by movement of users/objects.
FIGURE 6. Normalized temporal ACF, RXBA (1t) and RXAB (1t), at t1 in the
office environment with mobile scenario.
The experimental results in the reverberation chamber and
the office environment also indicate that in a dynamic envi-
ronment, i.e., mobile and object moving scenarios in office
environment and stirrer moving scenario in the reverberation
chamber, |Ĥuv(fm, t)| and Puv(t) are also WSS random pro-
cesses. Their ACF curves are similar to Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(c),
and not plotted for brevity. As a WSS random process, when
the time intervals between the samples are fixed, they will
have the same correlation between each other. As a conse-
quence, in a dynamic channel with users/objects moving at a
constant speed, it is feasible to use a fixed rate to probe the
channel, simplifying the channel probing design of the key
generation.
B. RANDOMNESS
Temporal variation is the main random source for key gen-
eration. An experiment was run with the same setting as
the mobile scenario in the office environment but lasted
300 s in order to collect more data for randomness eval-
uation. The channel was originally sampled at a rate of
0.96 ms, at which there exists redundancy between adjacent
data samples. Therefore, the measurements were resampled
by a period of Tp and then quantized to binary values using
the single-bit CDF-based quantization scheme introduced in
Algorithm 1. The optimal probing rate Tp can be found by
evaluating the randomness of the key sequence. The normal-
ized ACFs are shown in Fig. 6, from which the correlation
coefficient RĤAB (f1,Tp) and RPAB (Tp) can be read. It may be
observed that RXBA (1t) and RXAB (1t) overlap each other.
The randomness of the key sequence was evaluated by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
4470 VOLUME 4, 2016
J. Zhang et al.: Experimental Study on Key Generation for Physical Layer Security in Wireless Communications
random test suite [50], which has been widely used
in key generation applications [7], [8], [14], [15], [20], [21],
[24], [26]. There are 15 tests in total, each evaluating a
specific randomness feature, e.g., frequency test focuses on
the proportion of ones and zeros, and DFT test detects
the periodic feature of the sequence, etc. Each test returns
a P-value, which is compared to a significance value, α,
with typical value in the range of [0.001, 0.01]. When the
P-value> α, the sequence is accepted as random.We chose α
as 0.01, the same as other work [7], [8], [14], [15], [20], [21],
[24], [26]. We ran 8 tests, over half of the test suite, which
still satisfies the requirements of NIST. Some of the tests
require extremely long sequences which were not applied
in this paper. For example, random excursions variant test
recommends the input sequence longer than 106, which is
currently not available in our experiments.
TABLE 2. Randomness test results of key sequences quantized from CSI,
|ĤAB(f1, t)|. The gray cells fail the randomness test.
TABLE 3. Randomness test results of key sequences quantized from RSS,
PAB(t). The gray cells fail the randomness test.
The randomness test results of keys quantized from
|ĤAB(f1, t)| and PAB(t) are shown in Table 2 and Table 3,
respectively, where the gray cells fail the randomness test, i.e.,
P-value < α. As may be observed from the tables, when the
correlation between the two adjacent measurements is high,
the key sequence fails several tests. Temporal ACF describes
how fast the signal decorrelates against time and thus can
be used to determine the optimal probing interval. Too short
a probing interval between two adjacent measurements will
result in sample redundancy and impact the randomness of
the key sequence, while too large an interval will lead to a low
key generation rate (KGR) and limit its practical application.
In this example, the system cannot generate a random key
sequence from |ĤAB(f1, t)| until the correlation coefficient
between adjacent samples is below 20.2% and the probing
rate Tp reaches greater than 1.5 s, which is the optimal probing
rate.
C. CHANNEL RECIPROCITY
The channel fading at each end of the link is reciprocal. How-
ever, the signals measured by each user are asymmetric due
to the non-simultaneous measurements and the uncorrelated
hardware noise. The similarity between the received signals
of Alice and Bob can be quantified by the cross-correlation
relationship defined in (13) and KDR defined in (14) by
substituting XAB(tA) and XBA(tB).
The cross-correlation coefficients and KDR of the exper-
iments in the anechoic chamber, reverberation chamber, and
office environment are depicted in Fig. 7(a), Fig. 7(b), and
Fig. 7(c), respectively. As shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c),
when the channel is static, the independent hardware noise
is the only contributor to the signal variation, therefore the
cross-correlation coefficients are almost zero. The corre-
sponding KDRs in the static channel are around 0.5, which
are no better than a random guess. This makes key generation
un-operational as the legitimate users are not able to reach an
agreement.
As shown in Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(c), in themobile scenarios,
the correlation coefficients are high, and all the KDRs are
acceptable and could be later corrected by information recon-
ciliation techniques. For example, BCH code can correct up to
25% key disagreement [26]. In the object moving scenario in
the anechoic chamber and office environment, the correlation
is not as high as in the mobile scenario. This is because when
one user is moving, the channel is changing more signifi-
cantly than the object moving scenario where only some paths
are affected. However, as may be observed from Fig. 7(c),
when there are two objects moving in the office environment,
the correlation is as high as that of the mobile scenario, which
means the increasedmovement helps improve the correlation.
This can also be observed from the results of the reverberation
chamber, where there is rich multipath.
In all the examples, ρPAB,BA is higher than the correspond-
ing ρĤmAB,BA. As shown in (2), RSS is calculated by averag-
ing over one packet, therefore, some of the noise effects
have been canceled out. In addition, the channel estimation
Ĥuv(fm, t) is subject to synchronization errors such as fre-
quency and timing offset.
D. SPATIAL DECORRELATION
Spatial decorrelation is essential to the security of key gen-
eration systems. KDR is usually used to quantify the dis-
agreement between Alice and Bob. However, it can also be
extended to quantify the disagreement between legitimate
users and eavesdroppers. The cross-correlation coefficient
and KDR can be calculated using (13) and (14), respectively,
by substituting XAB(tA) and XAEj (tA). The average correlation
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FIGURE 7. Cross-correlation coefficients, ρXAB,BA, and KDRs, KDR
X
AB,BA, of
CSI and RSS with static, object (stirrer) moving, and mobile scenarios in
different environments. (a) Anechoic chamber. (b) Reverberation
chamber. (c) Office environment.
coefficient of channel estimation can be given as
ρ¯Ĥuv,u′v′ =
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
ρ
Ĥm
uv,u′v′ . (15)
The average KDR of channel estimation can be written as
KDR
Ĥ
uv,u′v′ =
1
M
M−1∑
i=0
KDRĤmuv,u′v′ . (16)
In this section, we use ρ¯Puv,u′v′ and KDR
P
uv,u′v′ to repre-
sent ρPuv,u′v′ and KDR
P
uv,u′v′ , respectively. Then we could use
ρ¯Xuv,u′v′ and KDR
X
uv,u′v′ for the simplicity of notation.
1) EAVESDROPPERS IN LINEAR PLACEMENT
Multiple experiments were carried out with different distance
configurations but the same setup shown in Fig. 3(a). The
results of CSI and RSS are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9,
respectively. The points with distances smaller than 0 are the
average correlation coefficients, ρ¯XAB,BA, and average KDRs,
KDR
X
AB,BA, between Alice and Bob, which are shown for
comparison.
As can be observed from Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, the shapes of the
curves in the same environments obtained byCSI andRSS are
quite similar while the absolute values are slightly different.
As shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 9(a), for the mobile scenario
in the anechoic chamber, when the eavesdroppers were in
the proximity of Bob, their correlation coefficients, ρ¯XAB,AEj ,
fluctuate greatly. This effect is more severe in an environment
with strong LoS, as the same phenomenon is not observed
in the reverberation chamber and office environment. In the
mobile scenario of experiments in the anechoic chamber,
even when eavesdroppers are separated far enough from Bob,
e.g., 40 cm (about 3λ) in this section, ρ¯XAB,AEj reaches a high
level and remains almost constant. In an environment with
little multipath such as anechoic chamber, the signal variation
is mainly due to the change of the LoS. Therefore, these
nodes experience similar signal variations and high cross-
correlation. In the object moving scenario, some ρ¯XAB,AEj are
even higher than ρ¯XAB,BA when eavesdroppers are close to
Bob. The system cannot be deemed secure in these dynamic
scenarios as the KDR
X
AB,AEj are very close to or even smaller
than KDR
X
AB,BA. In the static scenario, all the users, including
legitimate users, cannot reach an agreement on the same key
sequence.
The results from reverberation chamber are shown in
Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 9(b). There is very rich multipath in the
reverberation chamber, therefore, no matter how close eaves-
droppers are located from the legitimate user, their signal
paths are very diverse. Thus, eavesdroppers’ signals have lit-
tle correlation with Bob’s. KDR
X
AB,AEj are always around 0.5,
which indicates that eavesdroppers almost have no informa-
tion of the keys quantized by the legitimate users.
The experimental results from the office environment are
between the above two extreme cases, as shown in Fig. 8(c)
and Fig. 9(c). The multipath helps decrease the spatial cor-
relation between the users and KDR
X
AB,BA is much smaller
thanKDR
X
AB,AEj . This is very beneficial for the security of key
generation as it indicates that eavesdroppers cannot get any
4472 VOLUME 4, 2016
J. Zhang et al.: Experimental Study on Key Generation for Physical Layer Security in Wireless Communications
FIGURE 8. Average correlation coefficients, ρ¯ĤAB,AEj
, and average KDRs, KDR
Ĥ
AB,AEj
, with static, object (stirrer) moving, and mobile scenarios in different
environments. Eavesdroppers are in linear placement. λ = 12.44 cm. The points with distances smaller than 0 are the average correlation coefficients,
ρ¯ĤAB,BA, and average KDRs, KDR
Ĥ
AB,BA, between Alice and Bob, which are shown for comparison. (a) Anechoic chamber. (b) Reverberation chamber.
(c) Office environment.
FIGURE 9. Average correlation coefficients, ρ¯PAB,AEj
, and average KDRs, KDR
P
AB,AEj
, with static, object (stirrer) moving, and mobile scenarios in different
environments. Eavesdroppers are in linear placement. λ = 12.44 cm. The points with distances smaller than 0 are the average correlation coefficients,
ρ¯PAB,BA, and average KDRs, KDR
P
AB,BA, between Alice and Bob, which are shown for comparison. (a) Anechoic chamber. (b) Reverberation chamber.
(c) Office environment.
useful information about the key generated by the legitimate
users. The results of the mobile scenario validate the analysis
in [36], where the authors studied spatial decorrelation by
collecting RSS via laptops in an indoor environment.
It is worth noting that in the reverberation chamber and
office environment, even when the eavesdroppers are very
close to the legitimate users, their received signals are quite
different. However, in a strong LoS environment such as
an anechoic chamber, even when the eavesdroppers are
several wavelengths away (3λ in this example), they can
still observe a high correlated signal from the legitimate
users. Therefore, special attention is required to thwart eaves-
dropping in environments with strong LoS. Multipath is
usually considered to be detrimental to wireless systems as
it increases the complexity of the equalizer, however, it is
beneficial in key generation application due to the uncertainty
introduced.
2) EAVESDROPPERS IN CIRCULAR PLACEMENT
Further experiments were carried out by putting six eaves-
droppers around Bob in a circle as shown in Fig. 3(b).2
The experiments were done in the reverberation chamber
with stirrer moving scenario and in the office environment
with mobile and object moving scenarios.3 Eve4 and Eve5
were located between Alice and Bob while Eve1 and Eve2
were behind Bob. However, as can be observed from Fig. 10
2Only five eavesdroppers were used when the distance d = 7 cm due to
the space limit.
3Experiments with circular placement of eavesdroppers were not carried
out in the anechoic chamber due to installment issues.
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FIGURE 10. Average correlation coefficients, ρ¯ĤAB,BA and ρ¯
Ĥ
AB,AEj
, and average KDRs, KDR
Ĥ
AB,BA and KDR
Ĥ
AB,AEj
, with stirrer moving scenario in the
reverberation chamber, and object moving and mobile scenarios in the office environment. Eavesdroppers are in circular placement. λ = 12.44 cm.
(a) Stirrer moving, reverberation chamber. (b) Mobile, office environment. (c) Object moving, office environment.
FIGURE 11. Average correlation coefficients, ρ¯PAB,BA and ρ¯
P
AB,AEj
, and average KDRs, KDR
P
BA and KDR
P
AB,AEj
, with stirrer moving scenario in reverberation
chamber, and object moving and mobile scenarios in the office environment. Eavesdroppers are in circular placement. λ = 12.44 cm. (a) Stirrer moving,
reverberation chamber. (b) Mobile, office environment. (c) Object moving, office environment.
and Fig. 11, there seems no relationship between ρ¯XAB,AEj
and the location of eavesdroppers, because in a multipath
environment, the signal is coming from all directions due to
the reflection, scattering, and refraction, etc. This property is
quite beneficial for key generation, as even if eavesdroppers
are located between the legitimate users, they still cannot get
a better correlation.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper comprehensively studied key generation princi-
ples, i.e., temporal variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial
decorrelation, by using CSI and RSS collected from experi-
ments. The testbed was implemented using WARP reference
design, which supports IEEE 802.11 OFDM PHY and DCF
MAC. This enabled us to measure the channel using data and
ACK packets without any change to the off-the-shelf wireless
protocol. Over a hundred experiments have been carried out
in an anechoic chamber, a reverberation chamber, and an
office environment with static, object moving, and mobile
scenarios. The key generation principles were studied by the
experimental results. Both CSI and RSS were proved to be
applicable for key generation.
Through the comprehensive experimental results, we offer
insights and guideline for the key generation system design.
When the channel is sufficiently dynamic, temporal variation
is an ideal random source and the legitimate users are able to
agree on the same key. However, in a static channel, the cross-
correlation between the channel measurements of two users
is too small and the key mismatch cannot be corrected. In a
multipath environment, the spatial decorrelation is satisfied
and the security of the key generation system is guaranteed.
In an environment with little multipath such as an anechoic
chamber, eavesdroppers could observe a highly correlated
signal to the legitimate users, which results in potential infor-
mation leakage and requires special attention.
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